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Whether people blindly trust experts on all occasions or whether they evaluate experts’ 
views and question them if necessary is a vital question. This study investigates 
associations of human values with the readiness to question experts’ views (RQEV) and 
one’s reasons for not disagreeing with experts among randomly sampled Finns. RQEV 
and one’s reasons for not disagreeing were inferred from self-reported written accounts. 
Value priorities were measured with Schwartz et al.’s Portrait Values Questionnaire and 
Wach and Hammer’s items concerning rational and non-rational truth. The results 
showed that after adjusting for the effects of age, sex and education, the values of power 
and rational truth were positively associated, whereas the values of security, conformity 
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and tradition were negatively associated with RQEV. Further, the analysis indicated that 
the reasons for not disagreeing with experts were related to individual factors, 
situational factors, social risks and views about experts. 
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Introduction 
In many situations, it is important to listen to experts’ views and follow their advice. 
However, for society to function properly, it is essential that individuals also question 
experts’ views when warranted. Even though experts’ views are usually more likely to 
be correct than non-experts’ views, experts are sometimes mistaken (Weinstein, 1993) 
and their views can be distorted by interests or biases (Goldman, 2001; for a discussion 
of biases in the medicine, see Bornstein & Emler, 2001). Furthermore, many scientific 
questions are controversial, and views about these questions may differ (Kutrovátz, 
2010). Therefore, whether people blindly trust experts on all occasions or whether they 
evaluate experts’ views and question them if necessary is a vital question (Kutrovátz, 
2010).  
Despite the importance of people’s readiness to question experts’ views (RQEV), 
the topic has received relatively little scholarly attention apart from research on public 
distrust of experts or science (for a recent paper, see Harambam & Aupers, 2015). Other 
related research has looked into laypeople’s explanations for disagreement between 
experts on specific scientific topics (e.g., Kajanne & Pirttilä-Backman, 1999), thereby 
tapping into critical evaluations of experts and expert views. 
This study incorporates personal values (as defined by Schwartz, 1992) into the 
context of people’s readiness to question the views of experts or others in higher 
positions. To the author’s knowledge, values have not previously been considered 
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among the factors that may relate to such readiness, but previous studies have shown 
their relevance in such related contexts as non-adherence to doctors’ instructions, trust 
in institutions and authoritarian submission (Ahola, 2015; Morselli, Spini, & Devos, 
2012; Passini, 2015). Personal values—that is, what is important to individuals in their 
lives—have been associated with various attitudes (Boer & Fischer, 2013) and 
behaviours (Roccas & Sagiv, 2010), such as attitudes toward immigration (Davidov, 
Meuleman, Billiet, & Schmidt, 2008) and food choices (de Boer, Hoogland, & 
Boersema, 2007). The aim of the current study is to test whether values can offer 
insights into why some individuals are more prepared than others to question the views 
of experts. Further, the reasons for not disagreeing or not expressing disagreement with 
experts and the topics on which people have questioned experts’ views are examined. 
 
Relationship between experts and laypeople 
Weinstein (1993, p. 71) defined (an epistemic) expert as “a person who is capable of 
providing strong justifications for a range of claims in a domain”. In the present study, 
the concept of expert is understood in a wide sense, not confined only to scientific 
experts, but including also other authorities (for a review on the concepts of expert and 
authority, see Pirttilä-Backman, 1993), such as teachers and superiors. In the empirical 
part of this study, some examples of experts were given, but otherwise the respondents’ 
understanding of the concept was not circumscribed.  
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Much of what people accept as knowledge is indirect or testimonial in the sense 
that it is based on trust in other people’s knowledge (Kutrovátz, 2010). Trust as a 
psychological state involves accepting vulnerability based on “positive expectations of 
the intentions or behavior of another” in conditions of risk and interdependence 
(Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395)—conditions that may be especially 
pronounced in hierarchical relationships.  
Within public understanding of science (PUS), the relationship between experts 
and laypeople has been framed using two contrasting approaches. The deficit model 
assumes a one-way communication process from scientists to the general public, in 
which scientists, who possess all the necessary information, fill the “knowledge vacuum  
in the scientifically illiterate general public” (Miller, 2001, p. 116). Public’s possible 
doubts and fears concerning scientific issues are seen to result from their lack of 
scientific understanding (Sturgis & Allum, 2004). In contrast, according to the 
contextual approach people encounter science in specific contexts, and have their own 
purposes and motivations for using knowledge; people may make the effort to 
understand personally relevant scientific issues and to use their previous knowedge and 
experience (of the issue and of the institution behind the claims) in evaluating the 
trustworthiness of experts’ claims on these issues (Wynne, 1991; Yearley, 2000). 
However, instead of making such effort, people may also rely on heuristics or shortcuts 
like deference to scientific authority (Brossard & Nisbet, 2007), a concept that refers to 
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“an individual’s likelihood to believe, or at least accept, information from scientific 
sources” (Binder, Hillback, & Brossard, 2015, p. 5). Lack of deference and RQEV are 
conceptually closely related, but differ on their scope. Deference concerns scientific and 
technological controversies (Brossard & Nisbet, 2007), whereas RQEV considers issues 
and experts also beyond science. 
 
Readiness to question the views of others in higher positions 
Previous studies have addressed people’s willingness to argue or argumentativeness, 
which Infante and Rancer (1982) conceptualised as a trait comprising the interaction 
between the tendency to approach and to avoid arguments. A related line of study is on 
employee voice and silence—whether employees express their work-related ideas, 
suggestions, opinions, concerns and information about possible changes or 
improvements, or withhold them in work organisations (e.g., Morrison, 2014). Some of 
these studies focused on upward voice, that is, expressing such work-related ideas and 
suggestions to a supervisor or someone else in a higher organisational position (for a 
review, see Morrison, 2014), but fewer addressed specifically upward dissent. Another 
related line of study in the organisational domain is that on organisational dissent 
(Kassing, 1997). In the context of education, related concepts include instructional 
dissent (Goodboy, 2011) and student challenge behaviour (Simonds, 1997).  
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Kassing (1997) distinguished between three types of factors that influence 
whether an employee chooses to express upward dissent or direct their dissent 
elsewhere. Individual factors refer to the attributes of the employees, such as 
personality and communication traits, relational factors involve the quality of 
relationships within organisations, such as those between employees and supervisors, 
and organisational factors concern employees’ perceptions of the organisational climate 
in terms of how the organisation generally reacts to expressions of dissent (for a review, 
see Kassing, 2008). Considerations of costs and benefits of upward voice are also 
important; employees assess whether their dissent will be deemed constructive or 
adversarial, and whether it will evoke retaliation (Kassing, 1997). Further, employees 
are more likely to voice upward if they think it is safe (vs. risky) and has an effect (vs. is 
futile) (for a review, see Morrison, 2014). 
Similarly, Bolkan and Goodboy (2013) grouped university students’ reasons for 
not talking to their professor about an incident in which they were dissatisfied into 
personal (i.e., thinking it is not worth the effort, seeing the problem as their own fault, 
embarrassed to mention it, did not know how), relational (i.e., unapproachable teachers, 
seeing complaining as inappropriate, impression management) and organisational 
factors (i.e., lack of efficacy, fear of retaliation). Pirttilä-Backman and Keso (1998; 
Keso, 2002) investigated Finnish university students’ reasons for not having disagreed 
with their teachers or other experts in knowledge-related matters. They found the 
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reasons were related to knowledge or knowing (i.e., feelings of ignorance, trust in 
teacher’s expertise, thinking that teachers provide only opinions, not knowledge) and to 
a person, situation or stance (i.e., seeing such debate as uninteresting or unimportant, 
seldom meeting teachers or experts, thinking that “mass lectures” or the university 
atmosphere in general does not encourage expressing own views). 
 
Human values 
As mentioned above, human values may be among the individual factors that relate to 
RQEV. In his theory of basic human values, which builds on earlier research (e.g., 
Rokeach, 1973), Schwartz (1992) defined values as desirable transsituational goals that 
vary in importance and serve as guiding principles in a person’s life (for a review of 
value constructs, see e.g., Rohan, 2000). Deriving from the general needs of individuals 
and groups as well as the requirements of social interaction, Schwartz (1992) 
formulated ten basic values, each of which defined by the motivational goal it 
expresses, namely benevolence (protecting the welfare of close others); universalism 
(understanding, tolerating and protecting the welfare of all people and nature); self-
direction (thinking and acting independently); stimulation (excitement, novelty and 
challenge); hedonism (pleasure and satisfying sensuous needs); achievement 
(demonstrating one’s own competence in terms of social standards, thereby gaining 
personal success); power (social status and controlling other people and resources); 
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security (safety, harmony and stability); conformity (self-restraint from actions that may 
violate social norms and upset or harm others); and tradition (respect and commitment 
to the customs and ideas provided by culture or religion). 
Values form a circular continuum (see Figure 1) on the basis of how similar or 
different their motivational goals are (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). Compatible values with 
similar motivations are located near each other, whereas competing values are located 
on the opposite side of the value circle. The relationships between values can further be 
described by two dimensions. The first contrasts openness-to-change (i.e., self-direction 
and stimulation) and conservation (i.e., security, conformity and tradition); people can 
either pursue change and their own independence or emphasise preserving the status 
quo and its certainty (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). The second, self-enhancement (i.e., power 
and achievement) versus self-transcendence (i.e., universalism and benevolence), 
contrasts values that motivate people to pursue their own interests with those that 
motivate them to promote others’ welfare (Schwartz, 1992). Schwartz (1994) regarded 
hedonism as sharing elements of both openness to change and self-enhancement. 
[insert Figure 1.] 
Due to the interrelatedness of values, the associations between values and other 
variables will likely follow a specific pattern (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). Namely, if an 
external variable is positively related to a particular value, it should, in turn, be 
positively associated with adjacent values and negatively associated with values on the 
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opposite side of the value circle. The remaining relationships should decrease as one 
moves along the circle from the highest (i.e., most positive) association towards the 
lowest (i.e., most negative) association. 
In his theory, Schwartz (1992) posited that there is a comprehensive set of values 
with universal content and structure; that is, these values form a cross-culturally stable 
motivational continuum built on compatibilities and conflicts among values. Both the 
content and the structure of the theory have been empirically supported (Schwartz, 
2012; Schwartz et al., 2001). However, in some samples, Steinmetz, Isidor, and 
Baeuerle (2012) found deviations from the theorised values structure. 
The current study uses Schwartz’s (1992) theory of values and incorporates two 
truth-related values proposed by Wach and Hammer (2003a, 2003b, pp. 123–146), who 
suggest that these two values represent two sides of the truth and are in opposition to 
each other, namely rational truth (theoretical, logical and predictable truth) and non-
rational truth (belief in magic, intuitiveness, fatalism and the denial of rationality). 
Wach and Hammer (2003b, pp. 137–138) equate rational truth with Weber’s 
(1919/1970) ideas about intellectualist rationalization created by science and non-
rational truth with that which gives meaning to the world. 
Wach and Hammer (2003b) hypothesised that rational truth would be located 
between self-direction and universalism, and that non-rational truth would be situated 
between power and security. In their studies in six European countries (using different 
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versions of the measurement instrument), Wach and Hammer (2003b) found that 
rational truth always emerged near self-direction (either as a distinct region, as a 
subregion of self-direction or intermixed with self-direction) with self-transcendence 
values also adjacent to it (universalism and benevolence items were often intermixed). 
Based on this, they suggest that rational truth could be a subtype of self-direction. They 
studied non-rational truth only in one country (France) and observed that it was located 
closest to security, in a region between security and power. Thus, it was hypothesised in 
the present study that rational truth will emerge closest to self-direction with self-
transcendence values adjacent to it, and that non-rational truth will emerge closest to 
security with power adjacent to it. 
 
Values and RQEV 
In the case of RQEV, rational truth appears to be especially relevant because it may 
motivate people to question experts’ views in their search for the truth. Further, 
openness-to-change values—that is, self-direction and stimulation—are congruent with 
questioning experts’ views because they involve the pursuit of one’s own independence 
and readiness for change. In contrast, conservation values—that is, security, conformity 
and tradition—motivate the preservation of the status quo and are, thus, less compatible 
with questioning experts’ views. Relatedly, a previous study found that valuing 
openness to change over conservation was positively associated with non-adherence to 
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doctors’ instructions (Ahola, 2015). Also, openness-to-change values were negatively 
and conservation values were positively associated with authoritarian submission (i.e., 
passive obedience to authority; Passini, 2015) and trust in institutions (Morselli et al., 
2012). Therefore, it was hypothesised that self-direction, stimulation and rational truth 
will be positively associated with, and security, conformity and tradition negatively 
associated with, RQEV. This study also explores people’s reasons for not disagreeing or 
not expressing disagreement with experts, and the topics on which they have questioned 
experts’ views. 
 
Materials and methods 
Participants 
The data was collected in 2010 using a postal survey questionnaire sent to 1000 
randomly selected Finnish-speaking Finns, ranging in age from 15 to 65 (at the time of 
sampling) and living in mainland Finland. The first mailing yielded 210 returns, and a 
reminder letter yielded an additional 116 returns, making a total of 326 returns. Six were 
unusable because the respondent had not answered any questions or answered too few. 
The final sample size was 320 respondents, of which 60.9% were women and 38.4% 
men (two responses were missing). Respondents were born between 1944 and 1994, 
with a mean age of 45.8 (SD = 14.9) (three responses were missing). 16.9% had 
completed basic-level education, 34.1% had finished upper secondary level and 46.3% 
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had obtained a tertiary-level polytechnic or university degree (nine responses were 
missing). 
Regarding sample representativeness, older people were overrepresented when 
compared to the Finnish population aged 15 to 64 (Official Statistics of Finland, 2010b). 
The proportion of more educated people and females was also larger than in the general 
population aged 15 or over (Official Statistics of Finland, 2010a). However, the official 
statistics are not completely comparable with the present sample due to different age 
ranges and inclusion criteria. Nevertheless, a comparison of the rank order of values of 
the present sample to that obtained from a representative sample of Finns collected by 
the European Social Survey (ESS Round 5: European Social Survey Round 5 Data, 
2010) indicates that as regards values, the present sample should not remarkably differ 
from the broader Finnish population. 
 
Questionnaire 
The questionnaire consisted of parts measuring values, epistemic understanding, 
disagreement with an expert (or reasons for not disagreeing), questions about the 





The forty-item Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ: Schwartz, 2001; Schwartz et al., 
2001) was used to measure ten basic values. For each item, the respondent evaluated the 
similarity of the person described in the item to themselves on a Likert-type six-point 
scale (1 = not like me at all; 6 = very much like me). An exemplary item of PVQ 
(measuring conformity) is: “It is important to him/her always to behave properly. 
He/she wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.” The current study 
used the Finnish translation of the PVQ (Koivula & Verkasalo, 2006) and an additional 
six items developed by Wach and Hammer (2003b), which measured rational truth and 
non-rational truth values (translated from French to Finnish using a back translation 
procedure). Wach and Hammer’s (2003b, pp. 141–142) items are presented below to 
further clarify the concepts of rational and non-rational truth (translations from French 
are my own).   
Rational truth:  
He/she thinks that it is always necessary to progress and to deepen one's 
knowledge. What is true is important to him/her.  
It is important to him/her to understand the root causes of things. He/she likes to 
think logically and to appeal to his/her reason. 
It is important to him/her to develop his/her critical thinking. He/she wants to take 
into account the complexity of things.  
Non-rational truth:  
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He/she believes that most of the things that happen to us in life have a hidden 
meaning. He/she thinks that nothing happens by chance. 
This person thinks that the reason does not lead to true knowledge. It is important 
to him/her to rely on nothing but his/her instinct when making important 
decisions. 
He/she thinks that one must search for authentic reality beyond appearances and 
the measurable. Practices like magic, clairvoyance or astrology are important for 
him/her. 
A value score was computed for each of the 12 values. As three respondents had 
skipped more than 30% of the value items, their responses were excluded from the 
calculations of value scores and Cronbach’s alphas (cf. Schwartz & Rubel, 2005). 
Cronbach’s alphas (α) were .76 for benevolence, .82 for universalism, .61 for self-
direction, .76 for stimulation, .82 for hedonism, .88 for achievement, .76 for power, .65 
for security, .68 for conformity, .47 for tradition, .71 for rational truth and .53 for non-
rational truth. The relatively low internal consistencies for some values may be 
attributed to that they were measured with only three to six items and that the items 




For the RQEV, respondents were instructed as follows: “Recall a situation in which you 
disagreed with an expert (such as doctor, teacher, manager, subordinate) about some 
specific piece of information or knowledge-related matter. In case more than one 
situation comes to your mind, choose the one that has been the most important to you 
personally. Write briefly what it was about into the box below: From which field was 
the expert? What was the topic of your disagreement? How did the episode proceed? 
After that, respond to the questions below. If you have never disagreed with an expert or 
never expressed a differing opinion, explain why in the box below.” This procedure was 
adapted from Pirttilä-Backman and Keso (1998; Keso, 2002). RQEV was inferred from 
the written responses, as the following section will explain in greater detail. Overall 251 
respondents provided a written response, while 69 did not. One third of a page was 
provided, and the length of accounts in handwritten Finnish ranged from one word to 
slightly exceeding the space provided. 
Analyses 
Values 
The value structure and, in particular, the location of rational truth and non-rational truth 
values were analysed with ordinal multidimensional scaling (MDS, PROXSCAL) using 
IBM SPSS Statistics 22. 
RQEV 
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An initial categorisation and a coding manual of the relevant categories for the RQEV 
were based on a careful reading of accounts and were piloted by the author and another 
researcher. All the disagreements in coding were discussed, which led to some 
modifications in the coding manual and categorisation. The final categorisation of the 
RQEV consisted of seven categories with an intercoder reliability of .89 (Cohen’s kappa 
based on an independent coding by the author and another researcher of 17.5% of the 
251 accounts).  
The categories were further combined into three categories. First category, clear 
RQEV (n = 162, coded as 1), was mostly made up of accounts in which the respondent 
reported a particular disagreement incident with one or more experts (n = 145). It also 
included accounts in which the respondent expressed a critical stance towards experts or 
wrote that he or she has disagreed with them (n = 17). Second category, emerging or no 
RQEV (n = 61, coded as 0), involved accounts in which the respondent showed only 
some emerging criticism towards experts or expressed (sometimes indirectly) having 
had opinions of their own (n = 25). Further, it included accounts in which the 
respondent indicated not having disagreed or not having expressed disagreement with 
experts (it was sometimes impossible to clearly differentiate between these) or showed 
no critical stance towards them (n = 36). Third category, responses that cannot be 
interpreted (n = 28, coded as missing) involved reported disagreements in which the 
opposing side was not mentioned or in which it was unclear what roles were taken by 
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the respondent and the opposing side (n = 15). It also included accounts in which the 
respondent wrote that he or she remembers no particular incident, cannot say, or stated 
that he or she would skip the question or has no time to respond (n = 12). Finally, it 
included one reported disagreement in which the respondent played the role of an 
expert. 
Relationship between values and RQEV 
Point-biserial Pearson’s correlations with listwise deletion of missing values and logistic 
regression analyses were used to analyse the relationship between values and RQEV 
using IBM SPSS Statistics 22. Before conducting these analyses, respondents’ different 
uses of the PVQ response scale were addressed by centring the value scores, as 
Schwartz (2007) instructed. This procedure turns value scores into value priorities that 
reflect the relative importance of each value to the individual. Previous studies have 
shown that age, sex and education are associated with value priorities (Schwartz, 2007), 
age and educational level are associated with argumentativeness, and further, sex is 
relevant to both of these associations (Schullery & Schullery, 2003). Therefore, the 
effects of age (years), sex (0 = man; 1 = woman) and education (0 = lower level: basic 
or upper secondary; 1 = higher level: tertiary education) are adjusted for in the logistic 
regression analyses.  
A separate logistic regression analysis with RQEV as the dependent variable is 
conducted for each of the 12 values for two reasons. First, since values are interrelated 
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both theoretically and empirically, entering all values simultaneously into the regression 
model would have created multicollinearity problems (Sagiv, Sverdlik, & Schwarz, 
2011) as evidenced also in the present sample by large VIF values that exceeded the 
general threshold of 10 (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, p. 230). Second, there 
were not enough events (i.e., the smaller number of the two possible outcomes, in this 
case emerging or no RQEV) to fulfil the recommendation of at least ten events for each 
predictor in logistic regression analysis (Peduzzi, Concato, Kemper, Holford, & 
Feinstein, 1996) in case all 12 values were entered simultaneously.  
Preliminary checks of the assumptions of logistic regression analysis indicated 
that the assumption of linearity in the logit of age was not supported for analyses 
including stimulation, achievement, security, conformity, and tradition. However, age 
was retained as a continuous variable in these analyses following Chen, Cohen, and 
Chen’s (2007) recommendation.   
Reasons for not disagreeing  
The author perused all 251 accounts to locate reasons for not disagreeing with experts or 
for not expressing disagreement with them and identified altogether 63 accounts with 
such reasons. Of these, 58 accounts included general comments and five accounts 
included specific comments (relating to a particular disagreement with a particular 
expert). These accounts were further analysed and similar reasons were grouped 
together. Different parts of one respondent’s account could be placed into different 
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categories. The final categorisation system was created after several iterative rounds of 
categorisation. In translating the excerpts from Finnish into English, efforts were made 
to maintain the original meaning of the text. 
Topics of disagreement 
Respondents’ disagreement incidents with a particular expert or with several experts (n 
= 145) were analysed to identify the topics in which people have questioned experts’ 




Figure 2 presents the ordering of the 46 PVQ value items in a two-dimensional space. 
The lines in the figure are used to partition the space into separate value regions. The 
obtained stress-1 value of 0.13 indicates that the two-dimensional solution is adequate 
for portraying the relationships among the 46 value items (Sturrock & Rocha, 2000). 
Figure 2 shows that rational truth emerged as a distinct subregion within the region of 
self-direction with benevolence also adjacent to it. Non-rational truth did not form a 
distinct region, but was mixed with tradition, in a wide region between other 
conservation values and self-enhancement values. These two types of truth values were 
located opposite to each other.  
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Figure 2 further shows that the obtained solution is largely, but not completely, in 
line with Schwartz's (1992) theoretical value structure. A distinct region was found for 
all values except tradition. Deviating slightly from the theoretical model, some values 
emerged behind another value rather than side by side and some values emerged in 
reversed order. According to Bilsky, Janik, and Schwartz (2011), such splits and 
reversals of the order of two values are likely of minor importance when they involve 
adjacent values, which was the case for all but one of these deviations. Regarding single 
items, only three items were mislocated, shifting to the region of another value.  
[insert Figure 2.] 
 
Values and RQEV 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlations of the study variables. 
Regarding statistically significant (p < .05) zero-order correlations, power (p = .043) 
and rational truth (p = .003) were positively associated and tradition (p = .009) 
negatively associated with RQEV. Further, security (p = .078) and conformity (p = .067) 
were marginally negatively associated. Educational level was also positively associated 
with RQEV (p = .031) at a statistically significant level and the association of age (p = 
.074) was marginally positive.  
Table 2 shows the results of logistic regression analyses after adjusting for the 
effects of demographic variables. As regards statistically significant (p < .05) 
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associations of values with RQEV, power and rational truth were positively associated 
with RQEV, whereas security, conformity and tradition were negatively associated. 
Moreover, stimulation was marginally positively associated.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients for Values and Demographic 
Variables with RQEV.  
 Age  Sex  Education  RQEV  M / % SD 
Benevolence .03  .20 ** .02  -.01  0.65 0.72 
Universalism .38 *** .09  .10  .08  0.84 0.70 
Self-direction .07  -.04  .14 * .10  0.60 0.68 
Stimulation -.23 *** -.05  -.04  .10  -0.52 0.99 
Hedonism -.32 *** .05  -.17 * -.08  0.01 1.03 
Achievement -.42 *** -.16 * .01  .04  -0.79 1.11 
Power -.32 *** -.11  .04  .14 * -1.16 1.05 
Security .30 *** .03  -.01  -.12  0.60 0.73 
Tradition .11  -.10  -.17 * -.18 ** -0.81 0.83 
Conformity .17 * .00  .05  -.13  0.06 0.83 
23 
Rational truth  .19 ** .03  .18 ** .20 ** 0.63 0.75 
Non-rational truth .10  .13  -.15 * -.10  -1.25 0.87 
Age  ––  .05  .16 * .12  44.4 15.1 
Sexa    ––  .25 *** .08  62.9d  
Educationb      ––  .15 * 56.8e  
RQEVc        ––  72.8f  
Note. RQEV = the readiness to question experts’ views. n = 213 (valid cases under listwise deletion of 
missing values).  
a0 = man, 1 = woman. b0 = lower level: basic or upper secondary, 1 = higher level: tertiary education. c0 = 
emerging or no RQEV, 1 = clear RQEV. d% women. e% higher level education. f% clear RQEV. 
***p < .001. **p < .01. *p < .05. 
 
 
Table 2. Logistic Regression Analysesa for Values and RQEVb  
 b (SE) p OR (95 % CI) Nagelkerke R2c 
Benevolence -0.06 (0.23) .778 0.94 [0.60-1.46] .047 
Universalism 0.10 (0.24) .675 1.11 [0.69-1.78] .048 
Self-direction 0.29 (0.23) .212 1.34 [0.85-2.12] .057 
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Stimulation 0.33 (0.17) .054 1.40 [0.99-1.96] .072 
Hedonism -0.09 (0.16) .595 0.92 [0.66-1.26] .048 
Achievement 0.26 (0.16) .115 1.29 [0.94-1.78] .063 
Power 0.48 (0.17) .006 1.61 [1.15-2.27] .098 
Security -0.58 (0.25) .019 0.56 [0.34-0.91] .086 
Conformity -0.47 (0.21) .024 0.62 [0.42-0.94] .082 
Tradition -0.50 (0.20) .013 0.61 [0.41-0.90] .088 
Rational truth 0.52 (0.22) .017 1.68 [1.10-2.58] .085 
Non-rational truth -0.30 (0.19) .117 0.74 [0.51-1.08] .063 
Note. RQEV = the readiness to question experts’ views; OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval.  
aSeparate analysis for each value, n = 213–214. Analyses are adjusted for age, sex, and education. bRQEV 
is the dependent variable. cA pseudo-measure of R2 including control variables and one value variable 
(Nagelkerke R2 for control variables only ranged from .046 to .047). 
 
Reasons for not disagreeing with experts 
Analysis of the respondents’ reasons for not disagreeing with experts or not expressing 
disagreement revealed four main categories. All but ten (out of 63) accounts had 
components falling into these categories. 
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The individual factors category, which was the largest, involved different types of 
descriptions of the self. Many of these reasons were related to personal characteristics, 
traits or typical actions (e.g., “I have not disagreed with an expert, because I am an 
agreeable and trusting person”), or lack thereof (such as a lack of knowledge, inability 
to justify one’s own views, or not caring about others’ views). Other reasons concerned 
unwillingness to disagree (considering it futile, or seeking to avoid conflict, e.g., “I am 
uninterested in orally debating matters, because I don’t believe that expressing a 
difference in opinion like this leads to a better solution”), or trust in experts or 
professionals (e.g., “I have trusted experts’ professional skills and have not questioned 
them”).  
The situational factors category had two subcategories. First subcategory, 
importance of the issue, consisted of accounts in which the respondents explained that 
they express dissenting views only if the issue is important enough, or that they do not 
express their views if the issue or the difference of opinion is small or unimportant (e.g., 
“I have had a different opinion, but in those situations I haven’t felt the matter was 
important enough to mention. They have not been very significant topics or matters.”). 
The second subcategory referred to practical realities, for example, that the respondent 
seldom met experts: “I live in a very small rural village, so I have little to do with 
experts”.   
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Finally, the analysis revealed two small categories. First, the social risks category 
involved such reasons as an unwillingness to hurt the expert’s feelings or stand out. The 
first part of the second sentence in the following example reflects this category: “I have 
often disagreed with experts, but have just not expressed my opinion on the matter. I 
always think I want to avoid hurting the opponent or don’t want my opinion to lead to a 
heated discussion. That is why I have seen it better to keep quiet.” Second, some 
respondents argued that experts stubbornly stick to their own views or would reject a 
differing view (e.g., “They will not change their view, even though they are experts; 
their view is the only correct one”). This category was labelled as experts will not 
change their view.   
Topics of disagreement  
The topics on which respondents questioned experts’ views were varied. Some incidents 
were about personal issues (concerning the respondent, another person, a group or a 
community), whereas others were related to more general facts or knowledge claims.  
Disagreements with doctors and other social or health care professionals (n = 53) 
were most frequently reported. They concerned mostly personal health issues related to 
diagnosis (is there something wrong; what is wrong, n = 17), treatment of a condition (is 
a treatment needed; what kind of treatment is needed, n = 23), or inadequate 
examination (n = 4). Sometimes these aspects were intertwined, for instance a 
disagreement about a treatment could be based on differing views about the diagnosis. 
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Some incidents were related to general medical questions (n = 5) and the rest (n = 4) did 
not fit into these categories. Many disagreements with a manager or other superior in a 
workplace (n = 38) related to employment issues (salary, hiring, firing or vacations, n = 
14) or changes at the workplace (n = 6), while other topics (e.g., bad treatment, 
practices, n = 18) were varied and received fewer mentions each. Disagreements with 
teachers, principals, lecturers, researchers or professors (n = 33) concerned knowledge 
claims or their justification (n = 8), the correct answer or solution to an assignment or a 
problem (n = 5), grading (n = 4) and other various topics (e.g., rules, requirements, 
teaching materials, n = 16). Disagreements with other experts (n = 21) were less 
frequently mentioned.  
 
Discussion 
This study addressed people’s readiness to question experts’ views. The findings support 
the idea that personal values are important to RQEV. As hypothesised, individuals 
valuing rational truth were more prepared to question experts’ views and those valuing 
conservation (i.e., security, conformity and tradition) were less prepared to do so. Even 
though the associations of stimulation and self-direction with RQEV were statistically 
non-significant, they were positive, as expected. These results suggest, in combination 
with those of previous studies (Ahola, 2015; Morselli et al., 2012; Passini, 2015), that 
people endorsing openness to change tend to be more critical towards those in power, 
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whereas people valuing conservation tend to be more adherent, trusting and submissive. 
The observed positive association of power with RQEV was not expected, but could be 
understood by considering that those who value power might try to gain control or 
dominance over experts by questioning their views. This finding is also in line with a 
relationship between assertiveness and argumentativeness (Nussbaum & Bendixen, 
2003). Different motivations seem to underlie RQEV: truth and dominance. However, 
due to the cross-sectional nature of the present study, it was not possible to offer causal 
conclusions regarding these relationships.  
The order of correlations (Table 1) between values and RQEV around the value 
circle corresponded quite well to Schwartz’s (1992, 1994) integrated hypothesis, with 
only achievement and power clearly deviating from the pattern. Of Schwartz’s ten 
values, self-direction and stimulation had the strongest positive associations, with the 
coefficients progressively decreasing as one moves along the circle in both directions 
toward tradition, which had the strongest negative association. Wach and Hammer’s 
(2003b) truth-related values also fit the pattern. Notably, this is the first time these two 
truth-related values have been studied in Finland among randomly sampled Finns.  
Regarding the location of truth values in the value structure, results of the MDS 
analysis largely supported the hypothesis for rational truth. It formed a distinct region 
within the region of self-direction, which supports Wach and Hammer’s (2003b) notion 
that it would be a subtype of self-direction. However, the hypothesis for non-rational 
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truth gained only partial support: non-rational truth emerged closest to tradition instead 
of security; however, as expected, self-enhancement values (including power) were also 
adjacent to it. More studies involving rational and non-rational truth would be needed 
before making further conclusions, but they seem worth considering especially when 
focusing on knowledge-related topics.   
One potential limitation of this study is that the associations of values with RQEV 
were overall relatively small. One reason for this may be that many other factors (e.g., 
social norms) compete with values (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003). Further, it might be that 
different values motivate people to question experts’ views on different topics 
depending on how well an expert’s view aligns with the values people hold. If, for 
example, conservation values are very important for a person, he or she may generally 
not question experts’ views, but may be more likely to do so if an expert’s view 
advocates challenging the status quo. Unfortunately, the present data did not allow 
testing for this idea, because many of the accounts did not provide enough information 
of the content of the opposing views. Nevertheless, it would be an interesting topic to 
study further. Some respondents reported that they express their disagreement only if 
the issue is important enough, which suggests that the characteristics of the issue itself, 
such as its moral intensity (Jones, 1991) may be among the factors determining RQEV. 
Future studies could investigate the relative contribution of different factors to RQEV 
and include also issue-related and situational factors. 
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The dichotomous measure of RQEV used in this study may be seen as another 
potential limitation. Thus, another method of measurement may produce stronger 
associations, for example one that takes into account the frequency of questioning 
experts’ views. It would also be useful to be able to clearly differentiate between never 
disagreeing with experts, disagreeing quietly and explicitly questioning experts’ views, 
and whether different values motivate each of these. Further, since there is no validated 
scale to measure deference to scientific authority (Binder et al., 2015), these two 
measures could be developed simultaneously. It would be interesting, for example, to 
test empirically whether RQEV and deference are polar opposites of one dimension or 
form two distinct dimensions. 
An advantage of this study is that it used a population-based sample with 
respondents of varied ages and educational backgrounds and covered a wide range of 
experts. However, due to the low response rate and lack of complete representativeness 
of the sample, it may not be possible to generalize the results to the Finnish population, 
which may be seen as a limitation. 
As regards not disagreeing with experts, the reasons identified in this study were 
similar to those identified previously in literature on upward dissent (Bolkan & 
Goodboy, 2013; Kassing, 2008; Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003). Two types of 
reasons that emerged in this study—that is, trust in experts and practical realities 
(seldom meeting experts)—have previously been found only in Pirttilä-Backman and 
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Keso’s (1998; Keso, 2002) study which used data from Finland. Such reasons may, thus, 
be specific to the Finnish context or to cases in which experts’ views have not yet been 
questioned, and more studies looking at such cases would be welcome. The 
particularities of the Finnish context may both hinder and enhance RQEV, since Finland 
is characterised both by a relatively widespread trust in institutions and public 
authorities (European Commission, 2015) and a low power distance (Hofstede, 2001).  
Since many people are affected by experts’ views and decisions at various points 
in their life, it is important that future research investigates the factors and conditions 
that contribute to people’s preparedness to think about and challenge experts’ 
knowledge claims. The existing models within organisational and educational contexts 
and within PUS could be complemented with a more social psychological approach that 
would aim to understand people’s own experiences and stances concerning expert 
knowledge. It would also be useful to include issues beyond science that are important 
for people in their everyday life, for example some of those various topics (e.g., health 
or employment issues) which the respondents of the present study reported in their 
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